Prologue
In Labour Managed …rms (LMFs) workers own and govern the enterprise on an equal foot. LMFs exist in many countries and industries Pencavel, 1992, 1995; Moretto and Rossini, 2003) . For instance, LM banks are quite common in both developed and emerging countries and seem to contribute to equity and …nancial stability (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007) . Last but not least, LMFs are quite close to …rms belonging to the broad U.S. Census category dubbed Nonemployer (Moretto and Rossini, 2007) and, in particular, to the large subset corresponding to Partnerships, very popular among infant …rms in high tech sectors.
Whenever we compare a LMF with a pro…t maximizing …rm (PMF ), dubbed conventional, we come across some fundamental di¤erences in short run behavior, while a kind of long run coincidence holds.
In the short run the supply of the LMF reacts in a negative manner to a higher market price. The same occurs to the amount of labour hired. Moreover, an increase in …xed costs generates a larger membership as the LMF needs fresh employee-members to bear larger overheads 1 . These reactions, deemed as "perverse", are cast within the original modelling of the LMF (Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970) and are still quite popular. Unfortunately, they lack realism since they are based on the assumption that, in the short term, an LMF changes, as a result of market signals, the membership size decided at the foundation. This weakness has been amended by the proponents of the new theory of the Workers' Enterprise (WE ) (Sertel, 1987; 1991; Fehr and Sertel, 1993) . WE s, based on the evolution of the traditional LMF underpinning, are quite similar to LMFs, but for membership, that may give rise to two alternative arrangements. In the …rst, size is chosen at the time of entry in the market and is not liable to vary in the short run. In the second, there exists a competitive market for memberships and, thanks to it, the number of members can change in the short run. In both cases "perversities" of the LMF shy away 2 . In the long run LMFs, WEs and PMFs are indistinguishable. This has engendered the paradox maintaining that, in the long run, it is immaterial whether capital hires labour or the other way round (Samuelson, 1957; Dow, 1993) . However, this result should be taken with great care, since the long run comparison between PMF and WE has been so far con…ned to a static framework where the entry process is not explicitly modeled.
Here comes our main purpose, i.e. to model the entry decision and to test the long run convergence of WE and PMF facing market uncertainty and investment irreversibility. After all, one of the main reasons why WEs still represent a signi…cant chunk of the economy may lay in some basic a¢ nities with respect 1 We may consider hiring labor that will not become member of the LMF. This possibility is considered in the literature (Bonin and Putterman, 1987) . The resulting LMF is a sort of hybrid closer to a PMF, or, in other words, an intermediate arrangement between the LMF and the conventional …rm. 2 A further con…rm of the non-perversities of WEs come in a di¤erential game framework investigated by Cellini and Lambertini (2006) . to conventional …rms. In this sense we shall provide a further interpretation of the persistence of WE in many economies (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007) despite the ongoing mantra of their imminent demise. To interpret this unexpected survival (and ‡ourishing) we show fresh similarities between WE and PMF. The framework is one of dynamic market uncertainty where …rms possess the option to delay entry. In this scenario, …rms observe market demand. Then, they choose size and set the price, that triggers entry, in an optimal way, regardless of market structure (Leahy, 1993 , Grenadier 2002 .
With no uncertainty in a dynamic setting the trigger prices of WE s and PMF s are the same (Moretto and Rossini, 2007) : the two enterprises follow parallel patterns and in equilibrium cannot be distinguished. This happens if both …rms do not change, after entry, the amount of labour employed even when market incentives require it.
This assumption closely mirrors the internal organization of human capital intensive companies. Here, labor has a high speci…c value and …rms are reluctant either to reduce it or to increase it due to large adjustment costs. Whenever this rigidity occurs, the PMF gets quite close to a WE constrained by a …xed membership after entry. Without this constraint a¢ nities would shrink sharply.
The paper goes on as follows: In the next section we are concerned with the WE textbook case in a static environment; in section 3 we model entry, size and trigger prices under uncertainty. Conclusions are drawn in the epilogue.
The textbook case
We shortly present the WE static short run model drawn from current literature. 3 We consider a WE producing a homogenous good with the short run Marshallian technology Q(L), with
where Q is the quantity manufactured and L is the labor input. The good is sold at price p:
The WE sets optimal membership maximizing the surplus per worker (value added (y(p; L)) minus market wage (w)):
where I indicates the sunk -…xed cost. The short run (sr ) …rst order condition (FOC ) yields:
Provided that y(p; L) w > 0 we get the well known result that the optimal amount of labor employed by the WE in the short run is smaller than for the conventional …rm (PM ), given by the marginal condition pQ
In the long run (lr ) competition dissipates all rents. Fresh …rms, using the same technology Q(L); the same variable and …xed costs, will enter at the Marshallian point:
where AC(L) is the long run average total cost evaluated at the minimum e¢ cient scale, i.e.: L 
WE' s entry under uncertainty
The above analysis is con…ned to a deterministic framework and considers a WE already in the market, neglecting the entry process.
Our main purpose is to model the entry policy of a single WE in isolation regardless of rivals. In this sense, we may say that the …rm is myopic since it disregards any potential reaction by rivals. Therefore, we are bound to see what happens if the …rm becomes farsighted dismissing its myopic habit.
We begin investigating a WE that has an option to enter the market with an irreversibly sunk investment project of …nite size. The controls are time of entry and size in terms of labor membership.
In the vein of real option theory we assume that (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
1. The project, corresponding to a start-up decision, is of …nite size with an entry cost I and technology described above.
2. The investment I is irreversibly sunk. It can neither be changed, nor temporarily stopped, nor shut down, but it can be delayed while waiting for new information. 4 3. For the sake of comparison with the textbook case, the instantaneous short run surplus per worker after entry is equal to (1) when the market wage w per unit of labour is constant over time.
4. The WE faces an in…nitely elastic demand function: the uncertain market price is driven by the following trendless stochastic di¤erential equation: dp t = p t dB t with > 0 and p 0 = p;
where dB t is the standard increment of a Wiener process (or Brownian motion), uncorrelated over time and satisfying the conditions that E(dB t ) = 0 and E(dB 2 t ) = dt: Therefore E(dp t ) = 0 and E(dp 2 t ) = ( p t ) 2 dt; i.e. starting from the initial value p 0 ; the random position of the price p t at time t > 0 has a normal distribution with mean p 0 and variance p which increases as we look further and further into the future. Moreover, it should be noted that the process "has no memory"(i.e. it is Markovian), and hence i ) at any point in time t; the observed p t is the best predictor of future pro…ts, ii ) p t may next move upwards or downwards with equal probability 5 .
5. The project is funded by WE members, who are all alike and maximize the discounted value of expected individual value added.
6. Finally, as pointed out in the introduction with regard to the change in membership, L is chosen before entry and held …xed afterwards.
Given these assumptions, only if the price is high enough, the WE enters setting the optimal size (L). The decision process requires a backward procedure. First, for any L; the value of the individual option to enter is computed. Subsequently, homogeneous employee-members of the WE choose L which maximizes the individual (option) value at entry.
The employee-member of a WE of size L determines whether and when to start the new project solving an optimal stopping time problem by selecting the investment timing which maximizes:
Each employee-member holds an option to invest corresponding to (5) and has an interest in exercising it cooperatively at the same time. He waits up to time T; where T is a random variable whose distribution can be obtained from that of (4). Then, he invests when p t ; starting from p 0 ; reaches an upper value, say p T p W E . Assuming that p W E exists, taking expectation of (5), we are able to write the member's value function, before investing, as:
Moreover, by using some standard results in the theory of stochastic processes, we are able to show that (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 315-316; Dixit et al., 1999):
Then, we get:
where 1 < < 1 is the positive root 6 of the auxiliary quadratic equation ( ) = 1 2 2 ( 1) = 0, which may be used to get (6) . The individual option value (6) represents the expected net per capita dividend of the project, i.e., y(p W E ; L) w; multiplied by the expected discount factor, i.e., p p W E . This factor depends mostly on the volatility of the market price and the ratio between the market price and the trigger price that makes the …rm enter. If uncertainty is high goes down. Therefore, the optimal investing rule implies that f W E (p; L) > y(p; L) w for all p < p W E since f W E (p; L) contains the value of the option to enter 7 . Consistently with (1), entry occurs if the cash ‡ow generated by the project is weakly larger than the long run average cost. Maximizing (6) for p W E , we see that the WE should invest when the market price exceeds the break-even threshold:
which is the (deterministic) Marshall trigger AC(L) multiplied by 1 > 1; due to irreversibility of entry under uncertainty. The consequence is that, with new observations on market pro…tability obtained by waiting, the enterprise reduces the downside risk (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 142).
Substituting (7) back into (6) and maximizing with respect to L; the optimal entry size of WE can be obtained from:
where
The WE chooses the optimal size equating the value marginal productwhich is decreasing by concavity of the technology -to the "supplemented wage", that exceeds the market wage w: The Marshallian full cost of the investment imputed to each employee-member is w + f W E ; larger than w; since 6 The auxiliary equation has two roots:
We set 1 ; and a simple calculation may show that
7 Before entry p p W E < 1 and it has a power > 1: Therefore as uncertainty increases, goes down and the expected discount factor increases. As a matter of fact this ratio is smaller than unity with a power larger than 1 and decreasing.
The expected discount factor takes into account uncertainty (since depends on ), intertemporal preferences (since depends on ) and the relative price of the good at any t on the price of the good that would trigger entry. each member of the WE owns an equal option to delay entry. After all, would-be employee-members are workers endowed with the option (and the skill) to build an egalitarian partnership making for a compensation larger than w.
Let us now turn to the long run. Since competition dissipates all rents, the option value to delay entry goes to zero (i.e. f W E = 0). However, by the in…nite elasticity of demand, the optimal entry trigger (7) is not altered 8 . All …rms are alike and demand is in…nitely elastic. Then, each employee-member maximizes her individual option to enter. By doing that she ends up choosing the optimal dimension of the industry as a whole. This means that L lr W E is the dimension of a WE encompassing all employee-members in the industry.
Then, we may prove that:
Proposition 1 a) Long run competition forces the WE to operate with a larger dimension than in the short run, i.e.:
b) The entry trigger price reacts in distinct ways in the long run vis à vis the short run, i.e.: @p
Proof. Let us consider …rst the part a) of the Proposition. Substituting (7) into ( (6) and rearranging we write the L-th employee-member's value of the project prior to investing:
where the constant A(L) is given by:
By (9) the optimal dimension requires choosing L for which A(L) is the largest. This is equivalent to maximizing
which gives the …rst order condition:
Since the r.h.s. of (11) is less than one, a necessary condition for an optimal solution is an output elasticity " QL
Q(L) < 1; i.e., the average productivity
must be a decreasing function of labor, as from Assumption 1. Furthermore, by simple manipulation of (11) we get (8) . Consider now the option value to invest by the industry as a whole. By Assumptions 4 and 5, this is given by:
where f W E (p; L) is the value of the project for the L-th member of the WE, given by (9) . De…ning b(L) La(L); the optimal size is simply given by:
Over the range where the SOC holds a 0 (L
this will necessarily be:
De…ne now the average cost function
By taking the derivative with respect to L; we get:
Then, a valueL > 0 exists such that @AC @L = 0 and it is given by:
The second order condition con…rms that AC(L) is a convex function with a minimum represented byL: Since (15) and (11), we notice that in the short run the WE operates only in the descending branch of the average cost curve to the left of the minimum. That is:
which implies thatL > L sr W E : On the contrary,by comparing (15) and (13), we have:
which, in the range where the SOC holds, implies thatL < L lr W E :
9 The SOC is:
In general a 00 (L) < 0 does not imply that b 00 (L) (14) and (15), it may be shown that To sum up: 1. under uncertainty the WE enters in both the short run and the long run if the market price is larger than the average total cost AC(L) wL+I Q(L) multiplied by a coe¢ cient 1 ; 2. the myopic WE enters with a size lower than minimum e¢ cient scaleL 3. the farsighted WE, under long run competition, adopts a size which is above the e¢ cient scaleL:
In other words, in the short run myopic equilibrium, the WE operates to the left of the minimum e¢ cient scale, while, in the long run farsighted equilibrium, to the right.
Furthermore, we notice that, the optimal entry triggers of the short run WE and of the long run WE react in opposite ways with respect to dimension. Then, although we do not know whether p sr W E is larger or smaller than p lr W E ; since it depends on the shape of AC(L); as a result of competition -free entry -…rms exercise their option sooner. This occurs since the potential entry of new rivals reduces the value of the option to wait in the hands of the members of the WE.
Finally, in the long run the WE chooses optimal size equating the value marginal product to the market wage w: This choice coincides with that of a PMF that determines the amount of labor to hire before entry, sticking to it afterwards, regardless of market signals (Moretto and Rossini, 2007) . When considering the e¤ects of free entry, both the PMF and the WE abandon their respective myopic attitude and their behaviors converge, i.e., they enter with a size larger than that dictated by the minimum e¢ cient scale level and, ceteris paribus, wait less before entering.
Epilogue
In an uncertain dynamic environment …rms may anticipate competitive reactions of potential rivals. If they have the option to determine the best time to start producing and if they cannot change their size after entry, a long run coincidence between a WE and a conventional …rm emerges.
At entry, in a myopic environment WE s are smaller than conventional …rms. While, in the long run under uncertainty, free entry and risk neutrality a conventional …rm and a WE both enter with a larger size than that dictated by the minimum e¢ cient scale. Moreover, they wait less, as they both anticipate the e¤ects of entry.
Even though our results have been obtained in a simpli…ed framework, the coincidence of behavior at entry between a WE and a conventional …rm facing after entry labor rigidities, provide a further interpretation of the persistence of WEs in many industries where human capital speci…cities make labor ‡exibility costly.
A more realistic picture requires that each …rm perceive the industry demand in the long run as a downward sloping curve. If that was the case, also the optimal triggers would di¤er between the myopic and the non myopic WE. Nonetheless, as proved by Grenadier (2002) for the conventional …rm, the results do not change much.
